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Landowners in Opportunity, Montana sought restoration damages 
from ARCO, Anaconda Copper Mining Company’s successor, to their 
property from over a century of processing ore at the Anaconda Smelter. 
ARCO argued that CERCLA preempted and barred any claim for 
restoration damages. The Montana Supreme Court held: landowners could 
bring their state common law claims seeking restoration damages; the state 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction; and landowners’ proposed 
restoration fund did not challenge EPA’s selected remedy under 
CERCLA.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Montana Supreme Court accepted supervisory control over 
Atlantic Richfield Company v. Montana Second Judicial District Court to 
determine whether private property owners (“Property Owners”) in the 
Anaconda Smelter Site (“Smelter Site”) could bring a claim for restoration 
damages against Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) after the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) directed ARCO’s remediation 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).1 The Montana Supreme Court found that the 
Property Owners’ claims did not challenge EPA’s selected remedy,2 the 
Property Owners were not CERCLA “potentially responsible parties” 
(“PRPs”); 3 and the Property Owners’ claims did not conflict with 
CERCLA and thus were not preempted.4 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1980, the Anaconda smelter, which had processed copper ore 
from Butte for nearly one hundred years, shut down.5 Processing the 
copper ore produced wastes of arsenic, copper, cadmium, lead, and zinc, 
contaminating soil, groundwater, and surface water surrounding the 
smelter.6 That same year, Congress passed CERCLA, also known as 
                                                             
1  Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 2017 MT 
324, ¶ 5, ___ P.3d ___, 2017 WL 66294510 (Mont. Dec. 29, 2017). 
2. Id. ¶ 20.  
3. Id. ¶ 24. 
4. Id. ¶ 27. 
5. Id. ¶ 2.  
6. Anaconda Co. Smelter Superfund Site, Background, ENVTL. PROT.  
AGENCY, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm? 
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“Superfund”, which fosters the cleanup of sites with hazardous waste 
contamination.7 The Smelter Site was declared a Superfund site in 1983.8 
In 1984, Both ARCO and EPA were responsible for the Smelter Site 
remediation.9 EPA chose a remedy for the Smelter Site remediation in 
1998 and directed ARCO’s cleanup responsibilities.10  
EPA required ARCO to remediate residential yards within the 
Smelter Site with levels of arsenic in the soil greater than 250 parts per 
million and further required remediation of all drinking water wells with 
levels of more than ten parts per million of arsenic.11 Desiring full 
restoration to pre-contamination levels, a group of ninety-eight 
landowners, the Property Owners, in the Smelter Site obtained the opinion 
of outside experts for restoration remedies.12 The outside experts 
recommended removing the top two feet of soil and installing permeable 
wells to remove arsenic from the groundwater.13 The outside experts’ 
recommended restoration remedies were in excess of EPA’s requirements 
of ARCO for the cleanup.14 
Property Owners brought four common law claims of trespass and 
nuisance against ARCO in 2008.15 The fifth claim brought by the Property 
owners was “expenses for and cost of investigation and restoration of real 
property.”16 The restoration damages would be placed in a trust account 
used to conduct restoration work.17 
In 2013, ARCO moved for summary judgment on the Property 
Owners’ claim for restoration damages, arguing that CERCLA preempted 
the claim.18 Initially, the second judicial district court of Montana 
dismissed the Property Owners’ case, finding that the statute of limitations  
barred the claims.19 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and held that 
the statute of limitations did not bar the claims for nuisance and trespass 
because they were ongoing and reasonably abatable.20 
On remand, the district court denied all of ARCO’s motions for 
summary judgment, including their motion for summary judgement on the 
claim for restoration damages.21 ARCO petitioned the Court for a writ of 
                                                             
fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0800403#bkground (last visited March 6, 
2018).  
7. Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675 (2012)).  
8. Id. 






15. Id. ¶ 4.  
16. Id. ¶ 6. 
17. Id.  
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 5. 
20. Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2015 MT 255, ¶ 77, 380 Mont, 495, 
358 P.3d 131. 
21. Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 5. 
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supervisory control, and the Court issued an order granting it.22 The writ 
was specifically for the limited purpose of considering the district court’s 
order denying summary judgment to ARCO regarding the restoration 
damages claim, as well as the order granting the Property Owners’ motion 
for summary judgement on ARCO’s CERCLA preemption affirmative 
defenses.23 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court noted that due to the limited purpose of the writ, it did not need 
to decide the merits of the case, and ARCO was not precluded from 
challenging the merits of the Plaintiff’s claims.24 As a matter of law, 
ARCO argued that CERCLA precluded the Property Owners’ state law 
restoration claims because they conflicted with EPA’s remedy.25 ARCO 
argued that  CERCLA barred recovery where: (1) the claims were a direct 
challenge to EPA’s remedy and thus invalid under CERCLA’s timing of 
review provision; (2) the Property Owners were PRPs; and (3) the claims 
conflicted with CERCLA under the doctrine of conflict preemption.26 
Preemption can occur expressly, or “impliedly through the 
doctrines of field preemption or conflict preemption.”27 The Court found 
there was no express or field preemption because CERCLA’s savings 
clauses expressly allowed for state law claims.28  
Property Owners relied on Sunburst School District Number Two 
v. Texaco, where the plaintiffs brought a similar restoration damages claim 
and Texaco argued that Montana’s Comprehensive Environmental 
Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”), which is similar to 
CERCLA, preempted their claims.29 The Sunburst Court discussed 
preemption and held that since there was no necessary implication for 
conflict between the Department of Environmental Quality’s supervisory 
role and the common law claim for restoration damages, there was no 




                                                             
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. For instance, to recover restoration damages under state common law, 
a party must show: “(1) the injury to the property is reasonably abatable, and 
(2) the plaintiff has ‘reasons personal’ for seeking restoration damages.” Id. 
¶ 8 (citing Lampi v. Speed, 2011 MT 231, ¶ 29, 362 Mont. 122, 261 P.3d 
1000). 
25. Id. ¶ 9. 
26. Id. ¶ 10. 
27. Id. (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1591, 
1594-05, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015)). 
28. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9652(d), § 9614(a) (2012)). 
29. Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 338 
Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079. 
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A. The Property Owners’ Claim Does Not Challenge EPA’s 
Selected Remedy 
 
Section 113(h) of CERCLA (“timing of review provision”) 
describes the procedure for citizen challenges to EPA’s selected remedy 
in restoration cases.30 The timing of review provision presents a 
jurisdictional question regarding the state court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear state law claims involving CERCLA, as the statute 
only references federal courts. However, the Court declined to address that 
question because a dispositive and essential factor in the timing of review 
provision is that the claim for restoration damages must “challenge” the 
CERCLA cleanup.31  
ARCO asserted the Property Owners’ claim challenged EPA’s 
remediation.32 Recognizing it had not addressed what comprises a 
challenge to CERCLA remediation under the timing of review provision, 
the Court analyzed different circuits’ analyses of a “challenge” under 
CERCLA.33 The Court concluded that a challenge “must actively interfere 
with EPA’s work, as when the relief sought would stop, delay, or change 
the work EPA is doing.”34 The Court stressed that the Property Owners 
were not seeking to dictate EPA’s remediation, but instead were seeking 
common law damages to complete their own restoration, independent of 
EPA.35 Since the Court did not find that the Property Owners’ remediation 
claims constituted a “challenge” under the timing of review provision, 
Montana state courts are not preempted from exercising their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the Court found that there was no ongoing EPA remedial 
action.36 
 
B. Property Owners are Not Potentially Responsible Parties 
 
Under CERCLA, a PRP is “prohibited from conducting any 
remedial action that is inconsistent with EPA’s selected remedy without  
EPA’s consent.”37 ARCO argued that the Property Owners were PRPs and 
thus barred from remediation independent of EPA’s choice.38 The Court 
found that while the Property Owners could potentially be treated as PRPs 
had EPA or judiciary determined them so, the statute of limitations for 
determining PRPs had long passed and “the PRP horse left the barn 
decades ago.”39 
 
                                                             
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012). 
31. Atl. Richfield Co., ¶¶ 12, 14. 
32. Id. ¶ 14.  
33. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.  
34. Id. ¶ 15. 
35. Id. ¶¶ 15-17 (emphasis added). 
36. Id. ¶ 18. 
37. Id. ¶ 22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (2012)). 
38. Id. ¶ 24. 
39. Id. 
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C. Property Owners’ Claim Does Not Conflict with CERCLA and is 
Not Preempted 
 
ARCO lastly argued that the claim for restoration damages was 
otherwise in conflict with CERCLA in three ways.40 ARCO first argued 
that EPA has exclusive discretion to choose remedies at CERCLA sites 
and alternative remedies are preempted. The Court disagreed, reaffirming 
CERCLA’s savings clauses that expressly “contemplate the applicability 
of state law remedies.”41 Second, ARCO maintained that there was 
“unambiguous congressional intent” to preempt state law remedies in 
superfund remediation.42 The Court was not persuaded, again because it 
found that the Property Owners’ claimed damages and planned 
remediation did not challenge EPA’s remediation at the site, and did not 
prevent EPA from accomplishing its goals at the Smelter Site.43 Finally, 
ARCO asserted that any private remediation claims could not proceed 
until EPA’s remediation was complete.44 The Court already found there 
was no ongoing remediation and was not persuaded.45 
Having established there was no ongoing remediation, that 
CERCLA’s savings clauses expressly allowed for state law claims, and the 
Property Owners’ claim did not challenge EPA’s remedy, the Court held: 
“CERCLA does not expressly or impliedly preempt the Property Owners’ 
claim for restoration damages. . . .”46 
 
IV.  CONCURRENCE 
 
Justice Baker specially concurred, noting the decision was a 
“narrow one. . . .”47 The Concurrence discussed how CERCLA sets a floor 
for remediation, not a ceiling.48 Furthermore, the Concurrence noted: 
“[t]he dynamic between individual restoration and CERCLA’s 
coordinated large-scale response does not give rise to preemption as a 
matter of law.”49 The Concurrence discussed future issues for trial, 
separately adding if ARCO maintains that the proposed remedy conflicts 
with measures already taken to remediate the site, ARCO may address 
those conflicts while rebutting the essential elements in a state restoration 
damages claim.50 However, ARCO cannot “cloak itself” in the federal 
government’s authority, meaning ARCO cannot assert that because it 
                                                             
40. Id. ¶ 27. 




45. Id. ¶ 18. 
46. Id. ¶ 27. 
47. Id. ¶ 31 (Baker, J., concurring). 
48. Id. ¶ 33 (citing New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1246 
(10th Cir. 2006)). 
49. Id. ¶ 33. 
50. Id. ¶ 36.  
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complied with EPA remediation, the company does not need to do any 
additional remediation.51 
 
IV.  DISSENT 
 
The dissent characterized the majority’s conclusion as “not only 
inconsistent with CERCLA and federal precedent, but as having no 
authority in Montana law.”52 Fundamentally, the dissent disagreed with 
the majority’s holding that the Property Owners’ claim was not a 
“challenge” to EPA’s remedy53 and that the remediation was not 
ongoing.54  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the rights of private 
property owners in superfund areas to bring restoration claims against the 
PRP. The Court drew a line between acceptable monetary restoration 
damages versus compelling EPA to conduct said restoration. Finding no 
challenge to EPA restoration plans, the timing of preview provision did 
not apply, there was no CERCLA preemption for restoration claims, and 










                                                             
51. Id.  
52. Id. ¶ 37 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).  
53. Id. ¶ 37. 
54. Id. ¶ 51. 
